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LAWYERING WITHIN THE 
DOMAIN OF EXPERTISE 
David McGowan* 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval process 
was structured as criminal trials are structured and FDA lawyers embraced 
the epistemology of such trials—who’s to say what is safe and effective?  
That’s up to the jury.  Would you feel better about the drugs you take? 
Possibly you think the question absurd.  You might say that the different 
procedures have served different purposes and have been thought to 
implicate different values.  True enough, historically, but no rule of reason 
makes it so.  Technology, such as DNA matching, affects whether and how 
to try criminal cases, and there is no reason to think the influence of 
technology will lessen.  The best approach to the question would be to 
argue that we do not want drug approvals to resemble criminal trials, but 
that nothing follows from this fact—which doesn’t answer the question. 
So, would you feel better? 
This Article uses the history of patent prosecution to assess the 
relationship between the practice of law and the claim of an administrative 
agency to possess and to employ expertise.  By “expertise” I mean 
knowledge and procedures supported by consensus sufficient to justify the 
use of words like “fact” and “science.”  Expertise is a premise of certain 
types of regulation in the modern administrative state.  It is essential to one 
of the main promises of administration, which is that through rational 
inquiry, we can learn the truth of the matter about some topic and then 
regulate according to that truth.  Expertise is more important to some forms 
of regulation than to others, and it cannot answer all questions, but the 
concept is useful when analyzing the roles lawyers play in the regulatory 
state. 
An initial qualification is in order and will be elaborated later.  An 
agency that promises to use expertise to get at the truth might not do so.  It 
might not have expertise in the first place; even if it does, it may bend to the 
political winds rather than use it.  My argument is different.  It is that where 
 
*  Lyle L. Jones Professor of Competition and Innovation Law, University of San Diego 
School of Law.  My thanks to my colleagues at the University of San Diego, where I 
presented this Article, and in particular to Ted Sichelman and Maimon Schwarzchild for 
their helpfully skeptical comments.  Any mistakes are my fault.  This Article is part of a 
larger colloquium entitled Lawyering in the Regulatory State held at Fordham University 
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an agency claims expertise, that claim will lead it to give lawyers appearing 
before it less leeway than lawyers generally have. 
Agency officials claiming to exercise expertise need information to 
which they may apply it.  A patent examiner charged with deciding whether 
a claimed invention is novel and nonobvious relative to the prior art needs 
to know what that art includes.  The FDA needs to know whether a drug is 
safe and effective, and it requires data demonstrating these points.  Within 
the domain of expertise, therefore, firms and persons are subordinate to an 
agency’s larger regulatory mission.  Their role is largely to provide 
information the experts need and, possibly after some argument, to do what 
the experts say.  An agency claiming expertise is likely to think lawyers 
should subordinate their skills to its mission as well. 
I.  THE UNEVEN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
PATENT EXAMINATION AND EXPERTISE 
Rule 56 of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) asserts that “[a] patent 
by its very nature is affected with a public interest.”1  The rule imposes on 
“[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent 
application” a “duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, 
which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that 
individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section.”2  “Each 
individual” includes “[e]ach attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes 
the application.”3  The PTO’s more recently enacted Rule 11.106(b)(2) 
permits lawyers to disclose confidential or privileged information to the 
extent reasonably necessary to prevent a client from engaging in 
“inequitable conduct” before the PTO.4 
In contrast to the excessive notoriety surrounding the SEC’s Sarbanes-
Oxley Rules, the PTO’s Rule 56 has received comparatively little attention 
since it was first adopted in 1977.  The PTO’s broad rule of permissive 
disclosure, adopted in the PTO’s 2013 revision of its rules, has received 
even less.  In part, this is because patent prosecution is ex parte, and there is 
a plausible analogy between the PTO rules and the general principle that in 
ex parte proceedings lawyers must disclose material facts.5  But PTO 
practice long predates the American Bar Association Model Rules, and, 
unlike ex parte practice in litigation, in the first instance, patent prosecution 
is one-sided by design. 
We begin with the experience that led to the adoption of the PTO rules.  
As Jerry Mashaw has written, “[T]he first independent agency at the 
national level was not the [Interstate Commerce Commission], but the 
 
 1. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2015). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. § 1.56(c)(2). 
 4. Id. § 11.106(b)(2). 
 5. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
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Patent Office, created ninety-seven years earlier,”6 and we can learn much 
from its evolution. 
A.  Patents and Pigeonholes:  
Strict but Informal Review from 1789 to 1793 
Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to 
grant inventors, for a limited time, the exclusive right to their discoveries.7  
The power to grant patents differs from some other forms of regulation—a 
patent is something an inventor asks for, while many regulations are 
imposed by agencies on the unwilling.  Nevertheless, patents regulate 
competition in making, using, and selling inventions, and it is their purpose 
to do so.8 
When the first Congress convened, aspiring patentees took the logical 
step of petitioning Congress directly for an act granting exclusive rights.9  
John Churchman was one aspirant; he averred that “by several years’ labor, 
close application, and at great expense,” he had discovered magnetic means 
for deriving longitude from a given latitude.10  He asked “that a law may 
pass for vesting in the petitioner, his heirs and assigns, an exclusive right of 
vending of spheres, hemispheres, maps, charts, and tables, on his principles 
of magnetism, throughout the United States.”11 
Congress acted decisively:  it appointed a committee.  Committee 
members met with Churchman to hear about his invention.  Churchman 
brought a map and globe illustrating his ideas, and the committee was 
impressed enough to recommend that he be granted exclusive rights.12  
Congress was not going to appoint committees for every petition, though, 
and it discovered the virtues of delegation in short order.  It tabled 
Churchman’s petition and drafted legislation to kick the patent problem to 
the Executive.13 
The 1790 Patent Act (“the 1790 Act”) created a board comprised of the 
Attorney General and the Secretaries of State and War to review 
applications, which would be granted with two of the three votes.14  The 
relevant officials were Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and General 
 
 6. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law:  Federalist 
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1260 (2006). 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 8. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 107 (2014). 
 9. See P.J. Federico, The First Patent Act, 14 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 237–38 (1932). 
 10. Id. at 239. 
 11. H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1789).  He also sought “the patronage of 
Congress to enable him to perform a voyage to Baffin’s Bay, for the purpose of making 
magnetical experiments . . . .” Federico, supra note 9, at 239.  This petition caused 
congressional knees to jerk in different directions.  James Madison, busily espousing strict 
limitations on national power to oppose Hamilton’s financial plans, wanted to send 
Churchman to Baffin Bay. Id. at 240. 
 12. Id. at 239–40. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS:  A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
HISTORY 136–37 (1948). 
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Henry Knox.15  They called themselves the “Board of Arts”;16 others called 
them the Patent Commission or Patent Board.17  The 1790 Act instructed 
the board to grant patents only to petitions that claimed inventions the board 
judged “sufficiently useful and important” to deserve a patent.18 
This first move toward administration was modest, and procedures were 
flexible.19  Petitions for patents were “noted in the minute book, in which 
petitions are filed together in the desk up stairs in one of the pigeon holes 
[sic].”20  Another pigeonhole held petitions decided and drafts of patents to 
be issued.  “Some of the specifications are in said desk, and others in the 
closet.”21  The Board of Arts met monthly to read applications.22  The board 
required applicants to submit specifications according to forms; applicants 
with a lawyer used one form and applicants doing it themselves used 
another.23  In doubtful cases, Jefferson decided whether a specification was 
clear enough.24  Specifications were delivered to members of the Board of 
Arts at home and were sent from one member to another as read.25 
Administration was informal but hands-on.  A letter from Jefferson to a 
professor of chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania provides an 
example: 
Congress having referred to me a petition from a person of the name of 
Isaacs, setting forth that he has discovered an easy method of rendering 
sea-water potable, I have had a cask of sea-water procured, and the 
petitioner has erected a small apparatus in my office, in order to exhibit 
his process.  Monday morning 10 [o’]clock is fixed on as the time for 
doing it.  It would give me great satisfaction to be assisted on the occasion 
by your chemical knowledge . . . .26 
Apart from the delightful vision of Jefferson spitting out unpurified 
seawater in his office, this example reflects the informal and relatively ad 
hoc nature of the early patent system.  The need for expertise was acute, and 
Jefferson knew as well as anyone that he was not qualified, and did not 
 
 15. KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT OFFICE PONY:  A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT 
OFFICE 23 (1994). 
 16. Id.; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Knox (July 22, 1791), http://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-20-02-0307 [https://perma.cc/Q5CR-B7P4]. 
 17. DOBYNS, supra note 15, at 23. 
 18. Patent Act of 1790, ch.7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–12. 
 19. Further Memoranda from Henry Remsen, Jr. (1792), http://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Jefferson/01-17-02-0099-0010#TSJN-01-17-0136-fn-0001-ptr [https://perma.cc/ 
G29X-9YG9]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Knox, supra note 16.  Under the 1790 
Act, these were due upon issuance of the grant; in the 1793 Act, they were due with the 
application. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109–12; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 
Stat. 318–23. 
 26. Letter from Sec’y of State to James Hutchison (Mar. 12, 1791), http://founders. 
archives.gov/?q=potable%20Author%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22&s=111131111
3&sa=&r=3&sr= [https://perma.cc/8KCP-CBB8]. 
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have the time, to pass on every invention claimed in any field.  In 1792, 
Jefferson asked to be relieved from this duty.27 
Under Jefferson’s leadership, the Board of Arts was said to have 
“extremely high ideals as to the standard and dignity of the grant.”28  The 
board reviewed applications rigorously and demanded proof that the 
application specified an invention worthy of a patent.29  Disappointed 
applicants had no right of appeal, so they were no happier than Jefferson.30  
The system “was considered by the industrial classes to be inimical to their 
welfare.”31  Given Jefferson’s own views, it seems too strong to say that 
“the act of 1793 was passed at their instance,”32 but it does seem that both 
sides of the application process were happy to see the end of the system put 
in place by the 1790 Act. 
The country’s first experience with patent grants yielded two lessons 
relevant here.  From the start, the procedures distinguished between 
inventors represented by counsel and inventors prosecuting their own 
applications.  The advantages of counsel waned in the next period of 
administration but were later revived and persist to this day.  And 
examination strained the patience and resources of administrators and 
frustrated applicants.  This tension, too, persists under all forms of 
examination. 
B.  Registration:  
The Cure for Strict Review Is No Review, 1793 to 1836 
The 1793 Patent Act (“the 1793 Act”) allocated authority over patents to 
the State Department but eliminated substantive review of petitions.  
Section 3 of the Act required that inventors swear an oath that, to their 
knowledge, they were the true inventor of the discoveries claimed in the 
petition.33  Section 1 of the 1793 Act required novelty—that the petition 
claim a “new and useful” invention, but absent examination enforcement of 
this term rested on the oath.34  The 1793 Act is commonly said to have 
instituted a system of registering rather than examining petitions.35 
 
 27. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson (Apr. 1, 1792), 
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=%22hugh%20williamson%22%20Author%3A%22Jefferson
%2C%20Thomas%22&s=1211311111&sa=&r=12&sr= [https://perma.cc/27E7-GNSF]. 
 28. William I. Wyman, The Patent Act of 1836, 1 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 203, 203 (1918); 
see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), http://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0322 [https://perma.cc/9BTU-LXH8].  In this 
letter, Jefferson states very modern conceptions of novelty and equivalence. Id. 
 29. See Wyman, supra note 28, at 203. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.; cf. Daniel Preston, The Administration and Reform of the U.S. Patent Office, 
1790–1836, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 331, 347 n.32 (1985) (arguing that inventors and 
manufacturers were not influential in securing reforms of the deficiencies soon apparent 
under the 1793 Act). 
 33. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318–23. 
 34. Id. § 1. 
 35. See The Patent Act of 1836, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 91 (1936).  The 1793 Act said 
only that it “shall and may be lawful” for the Secretary of State to issue patents to persons 
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Both the 1790 and 1793 Acts required inventors to deliver written 
descriptions and models of their inventions, but patent granting remained 
informal.  A vast bureaucracy it was not.  Until 1802, all patent work was 
performed by one clerk in the State Department, whose work did not fill 
“over a dozen pigeonholes.”36  In 1802, Jefferson put William Thornton in 
charge of patents.37  Thornton “exercised an autocratic control of the affairs 
of the Patent Office” for the next twenty-six years.38 
During this time, inventors commonly wrote their own petitions and 
made their own models.39  Inventors who could not make the trip to 
Washington sometimes gave their materials to legislators, who presented 
them on behalf of their constituents.40  Thornton sought to help inventors 
understand the paperwork that would be required to register their 
inventions.  In March 1811, he issued a pamphlet that must be among the 
earliest American guides to administrative procedure.41  Thornton advised 
prospective applicants to study prior art and consult experts if needed to 
ensure the supposed invention would be practicable, provided a form for the 
petition, described what the specification should do, emphasized the need 
for specific drawings, and suggested that draftsmen sign their drawings so 
future petitioners would know where to go for work that met the standards 
of the office.42 
Congressional indifference partly explains why Thornton ran the office 
on his own terms.  The 1793 Act did not create a separate patent office, so 
Thornton was technically a State Department clerk.  In 1818, Congress 
approved a salary for a Superintendent of Patents, but it was lower than that 
paid to other department heads.43  Thornton’s first clerk worked his first 
 
who “shall allege” creation of a new and useful invention, Patent Act of 1793 § 1, but the 
language was interpreted to make issuance essentially a matter of right subject to compliance 
with form. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Frederick Guyer (Apr. 26, 1793), 
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=patent%20Author%3A%22Jefferson%2C%20Thomas%22
&s=1111311113&r=62 [https://perma.cc/22DJ-UX99] (“I suppose it had escaped your 
notice that that board was discontinued by the late Congress, and that the business of issuing 
patents was referred to the department of state, from which they are given out as a matter of 
right on the party’s complying with certain conditions required by the law.”).  Sources 
documenting the position that the office had no power to reject an application complying 
with formal requirements are collected in John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System:  
Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1071, 1125 n.214 (2000).  The 1793 Act also provided for resolution of interfering 
applications, a response to competing applications for steamboat technology under the 1790 
Act. The Patent Act of 1793, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 77, 79 (1936). 
 36. George W. Evans, The Birth and Growth of the Patent Office, in 22 RECORDS OF THE 
COLUMBIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 105, 108 (John B. Larner ed., 1919). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Kara W. Swanson, The Emergence of the Professional Patent Practitioner, 50 TECH. 
& CULTURE 519, 524 (2009). 
 40. Id.; Robert C. Post, “Liberalizers” Versus “Scientific Men” in the Antebellum 
Patent Office, 17 TECH. & CULTURE 24, 29 n.14 (1976). 
 41. The pamphlet is reprinted in a note. See Patents, 6 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 97, 98 (1923). 
 42. Id. at 101–02. 
 43. Preston, supra note 32, at 335. 
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year without pay and had to petition Congress for a salary.44  Thornton and 
his wife sometimes copied out patents at their home in the evenings.45  
Errors were sometimes made in patents and Thornton would correct them 
for free, a fact that came to light when it was discovered that “[t]he 
Department of State, the Patent Office, and the Treasury all had annual lists 
of patents issued, all three were different, and none agreed with the annual 
receipts.”46 
The 1793 Act was an invitation to perfidy, piracy, and confusion.  In a 
letter to Isaac McPherson, famous today for its invocation of what we now 
would call the theory of public goods, Jefferson lamented the abandonment 
of expert review, even as limited as it had been under the 1790 Act, in favor 
of the inexpert processes of litigation.  Referring to preissuance 
examination, he wrote: 
[I]nstead of refusing a patent in the first instance, as the board was 
authorised to do, the patent now issues of course, subject to be declared 
void on such principles as should be established by the courts of law.  
[T]his business however is but little analogous to their course of reading, 
since we might in vain turn over all the lubberly volumes of the law to 
find a single ray which would lighten the path of the Mechanic or 
Mathematician.  [I]t is more within the information of a board of 
Academical professors, and a previous refusal of patent would better 
guard our citizens against harrassment [sic] by lawsuits.  [B]ut England 
had given it to her judges, and the usual predominancy of her examples 
carried it to ours.47 
Jefferson’s customary Anglophobia is on display here, but so is his 
conviction, earned through practice as well as brilliance, that ex ante expert 
review is preferable to the more capacious inquiries judges would allow in 
court. 
C.  The 1836 Act and the Ideal of Expertise 
Substantive examination occurred before 1836 but was irregular and 
arguably inconsistent with the thrust of the 1793 Act.48  The Senate report 
accompanying the bill that became the 1836 Act chronicled the deficiencies 
of the registration approach: 
1. A considerable portion of all the patents granted are worthless 
and void, as conflicting with, and infringing upon one another, or 
upon, public rights . . . . 
 
 44. Id. at 336. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 339. 
 47. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 28. 
 48. S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 3 (1836).  The charge of inconsistency refers to Thornton’s 
occasional refusal to register patents “in cases notoriously without merit.” Wyman, supra 
note 28, at 210; see also Preston, supra note 32, at 343 (“[T]he secretary repeatedly told him 
that no matter how correct his judgment of the worth of an application, the law required him 
to issue the patent.  Thornton never accepted this verdict.”). 
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2. The country becomes flooded with patent monopolies, 
embarrassing to bona fide patentees, whose rights are thus 
invaded on all sides; and not less embarrassing to the community 
generally, in the use of even the most common machinery and 
long-known improvements in the arts and common manufactures 
of the country. 
3. Out of this interference and collision of patents and privileges, a 
great number of lawsuits arise, which are daily increasing in an 
alarming degree, onerous to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and 
injurious to society. 
4. It opens the door to frauds, which have already become extensive 
and serious.  It is represented to the committee that it is not 
uncommon for persons to copy patented machines in the model-
room; and, having made some slight immaterial alterations, they 
apply in the next room for patents.  There being no power given 
to refuse them, patents are issued of course.  Thus prepared, they 
go forth on a retailing expedition, selling out their patent 
rights . . . .  [S]everal hundred thousand dollars, it is estimated, 
are paid annually for void patents, many of which are thus 
fraudulently obtained.49 
Delay in processing petitions provided Congress the motivation needed 
to change the system.  Senator John Ruggles, an inventor himself, was irked 
by the delay and proposed congressional action.50  Ruggles chaired a 
committee to deal with the situation.51  He solicited the views of Henry 
Ellsworth, son of former Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth and then-
Superintendent of Patents, as to what should be done to reform the office.52  
Ellsworth emphasized the need for expertise:  “If scientific men could be 
induced to take an office in the patent bureau, as examiners of patents, their 
examinations, aided by a suitable library, would detect almost every 
interference or want of novelty.”53 
Ellsworth got what he wanted.  Under the 1836 Act an inventor’s claims 
would be examined rather than accepted.54  As Ruggles wrote early the next 
year, following the fire that consumed the Patent Office in December 1836, 
an examiner had to be “fully acquainted with the principles of the invention 
for which a patent is sought,” willing and able to investigate “all that has 
been before known or invented either in Europe or America, on the 
 
 49. S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 3 . 
 50. Id. at 3–4. 
 51. DOBYNS, supra note 15, at 97. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Report of Henry L. Ellsworth to the Select Committee on the Patent Laws, 8 
MECHANICS’ MAG. & J. MECHANICS’ INST. 175, 178 (1836). 
 54. Section 6 of the 1836 Act carried forward the requirement of an inventor’s oath, and 
the pamphlet provided a form for that oath.  The form required an inventor to aver that “he 
verily believes himself to be the original and first inventor of” the invention and that “he 
does not know or believe the same was ever before known or used.” THE PATENT LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER WITH INFORMATION FOR PERSONS HAVING BUSINESS TO 
TRANSACT AT THE PATENT OFFICE 20 (1849), https://archive.org/details/patentlawsofunit00 
unit [https://perma.cc/43GS-NA79]. 
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particular subject presented for his examination,” and capable of 
determining “how far the invention interferes in any of its parts with other 
previous inventions or things previously in use.”55  These tasks often were 
difficult because applicants employed “skilful [sic] and persevering council 
[sic] to urge and enforce by argument new views of the principles of his 
invention, who sometimes brings to his aid much mechanical astuteness.”56  
As if all this were not enough, examiners needed “a familiar knowledge of 
the statute and common law on the subject, and the judicial decisions both 
in England and our own country, in patent cases.”57 
One commentator, himself a chief clerk of the office in the early 
twentieth century, linked the 1836 reforms to rational (scientific) 
administration more generally, writing that the Patent Act of 1836 (“the 
1836 Act”) placed “the means for ascertaining and decreeing rights of 
property in ideas and promoting the objects of a system of patent 
protection . . . on an intelligent, scientific and adequate basis . . . .”58  That 
assessment was too rosy, as we will see, but under the 1836 Act, the Patent 
Office did become an administrative agency in a sense recognizable 
today—and well before the modern administrative state began to take 
shape.  The 1836 Act created the office of Commissioner of Patents, and 
Ellsworth became the first Commissioner, overseeing a chief clerk, an 
examining clerk, three additional clerks, a machinist, and a messenger.59 
The prospect of examination created demand for professionals who could 
prepare an inventor’s petition with an eye to examination and represent the 
inventor’s interests during the examination.  Within months of the 1836 
Act’s adoption, a well-known scientific figure and former Superintendent of 
Patents, Dr. Thomas Jones, opened an office and begun to advertise his 
services to aspiring patentees.60  When Congress authorized a second 
examiner’s position in 1837, Jones filled it.  He kept the job for a year 
before resuming his private practice.61  During his brief return tenure, he 
appears to have examined applications he had drawn up.62  The 
examination system became law in July 1836; by January 1837, as we have 
seen, Ruggles already was referring to the practice of employing “skilful 
[sic] and persevering council [sic] to urge and enforce by argument new 
views of the principles of his invention.”63 
 
 55. S. BILL NO. 107, report at 6 (1837). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Wyman, supra note 28, at 209. 
 59. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 2, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).  Ellsworth asked for these 
positions in his message to Congress. Report of Henry Ellsworth to the Select Committee on 
the Patent Laws, supra note 53, at 181. 
 60. DOBYNS, supra note 15, at 110; Swanson, supra note 39, at 525; Post, supra note 40, 
at 27, 29. 
 61. Post, supra note 40, at 29. 
 62. Id. at 29 n.15. 
 63. S. BILL NO. 107, report at 6 (1837). 
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D.  Inventors, Agents, and the Ideal of Service 
The ideal of disinterested expertise waxed at the Patent Office during this 
period.  Yet the ideal created its own challenges.  Thomas was only the first 
of many Patent Office officials to construct the early equivalent of the 
revolving door of administration.  Keller himself remained in the office 
until 1844 when, Congress having refused requests to increase pay, he 
resigned and formed a patent agency with John J. Greenough, a former 
department draftsman.64  (Samuel B. Morse was a client.65)  Perhaps 
because of his familiarity with the models, Keller was a strict examiner.  At 
the beginning of the application era, he denied three-quarters of the 
applications he reviewed.66  His approach to patentability became more 
liberal when he became an agent.67 
As Robert Post has shown, Keller’s shift reflected tension between 
“scientific” administration of the patent system and a more service-oriented 
approach focused on inventors rather than invention.68  In 1837, Ellsworth 
stated his intention “to err (if at all) on the side of liberality, leaving the 
parties affected to the courts, to contest their doubtful rights,”69 but the 
grant rate before 1857 was almost always 50 percent or lower,70 sinking as 
low as 31 percent in 1853.71  This fact is likely attributable in part both to 
the qualifications of the examiners and to their willingness to employ their 
expertise.72  Keller in particular had seen the deficiencies of registration 
first hand and had taken a direct role in drafting and securing adoption of 
the examination system.  He likely intended that these reforms be given full 
effect. 
At first, examiners had the sort of “extensive scientific attainments” 
Senator Ruggles thought they needed.73  But qualified examiners capable of 
exercising disinterested expertise were not an unqualified blessing for 
applicants and their counsel.  Such examiners “often proved most 
resourceful at ferreting out evidence on which to base rejections for lack of 
novelty.  For a time, such men thoroughly dominated the examining 
corps. . . .  [T]heir philosophical proclivities ultimately rendered them 
anathema to the patrons of the Patent Office.”74 
Inventors and their counsel formed an effective interest group, and they 
were perfectly capable of expressing their dissatisfaction with expert 
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examination.  Over time, patent agents became an organized and effective 
lobby, with the Scientific American as a useful podium.75  The magazine 
was then owned by Orson Munn and Alfred Beach and affiliated with 
Munn & Co., a leading patent agency.76  The combination was 
complementary.  For example, Scientific American reprinted the 
“Information to Persons Having Business to Transact at the Patent Office” 
pamphlet, together with insertions by Scientific American advertising its 
services as a patent agent.77 
Inventors were a relatively concentrated group compared to consumers, 
and patent agents were more concentrated still.  Patent agents’ interests also 
differed from inventors’ interests in important ways.  Ruggles’s assessment 
of the benefits of examination pointed out that an examiner could point 
applicants to prior art and to issued patents that might undercut the 
economic value of an applicant’s invention even if he obtained a patent.78  
Rigorous examination might deflate false hope and prevent inventors from 
sinking costs into litigation that would be doomed to failure.79  Patent 
agents, on the other hand, had a substantial stake in securing issuance of a 
patent without regard to the subsequent value of the patent.  This interest 
would be bounded only by the risk that examination would become so lax 
that patents in general might fall into disrepute, deflate in value, and thereby 
reduce demand for the agents’ services.80  In any given case, an agent 
would prefer to secure a grant and declare that they had done their job, 
regardless of litigation nightmares that might follow from issuance of 
overlapping and conflicting claims.81 
Patent commissioners found it in their interest to reassure inventors.  
Ellsworth left in 1845.82  His successor, Edmund Burke, wrote that “[a]n 
examiner should be a living encyclopedia of science,”83 but he was equally 
concerned with inventors’ welfare.  His 1846 report asserts that “it cannot 
be denied that, upon the principles of abstract justice, the inventor has a 
complete and unquestionable claim to the fruits of his discoveries until his 
labors and sacrifices are adequately remunerated,” and he recommended 
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that, in litigation, patents be treated as conclusive rather than presumptive 
evidence of validity (novelty), subject to fraud-based defenses.84 
Demand for patents created tension with the ideal of expert examination.  
By 1848, congressional debates over expanding the office staff devolved 
into arguments over how hard the work really was and what salary was 
required to attract competent examiners.  The Senate passed legislation 
adding two examiners and raising the salary to $2500 per year.85  The 
House opted for $2000; Andrew Johnson of Tennessee argued against 
increases and actually moved for a reduction in the Commissioner’s 
salary.86  The Senate held firm; Senator Westcott argued that the office had 
already lost five examiners who commanded twice their salary in private 
practice.87  Congress authorized the additional positions at the higher 
salary, but Burke’s report for 1848 emphasized that the grant rate had gone 
up in recent years.88  And when it came time to fill the new jobs, Secretary 
of State Buchanan reviewed the political sympathies of the candidates.89  
The writing was on the wall. 
In 1849, Thomas Ewbank replaced Burke, and the Patent Office moved 
from the jurisdiction of the State Department to the newly created 
Department of the Interior.90  As Kara Swanson has noted, Ewbank’s first 
report reflected ambivalence toward patent agents.91  Ewbank asserted that 
“[t]he superiority of our system consists also in the rejection of intricate 
legal forms, so that every inventor of ordinary capacity may make out and 
pass through the office his own papers, without the intervention of attorney 
or agent.”92  He also lumped agents with a certain class of inventors who 
“speculated upon” the office and found it “cheaper to give the office ten 
dollars for the investigation of a case than to purchase the necessary books 
and examine for themselves.”93  Recently out of office, Burke himself may 
have elaborated on this charge.  An unsigned article in Scientific American 
insisted that, though the office was constantly accused of “partiality and 
corruption,” 
these charges mainly emanated, not from inventors, but from agents and 
patent pirates; and if such charges are now made, we have no doubt they 
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in the main proceed from like sources. . . .  [S]uch persons . . .  are the 
pests of scientific improvement, instead of its promoters.  Instead of 
trammelling the hands of the Commissioner, Congress should give him 
power to expel from the office, and disqualify from all future business 
intercourse with it, patent agents, when guilty of offenses which 
disqualify them from doing business in any respectable court of justice.94 
It is fair to read this rejoinder as seeking to divide inventors from agents 
and align the office with the comparatively sympathetic interests of 
inventors.  By raising the prospect of disqualifying patent agents, this 
comment asserted the primacy of examination, and thus of expertise, over 
the tactics of agents.  As is usually the case, such an assertion would not be 
necessary unless the tactics were effective.  Agents could hardly be 
expected to take such criticism lying down, and in its next issue, Scientific 
American fired back: 
The business of the Patent Office, as it respects decisions upon 
applications, is conducted upon a system of erratics.  Applications are 
granted or rejected, according to the state of mind the examiners may be 
in.  There are four chief examiners in the Patent Office, each a feudal 
baron on his own domain.  Their decisions, therefore, sometimes resemble 
boys shooting marbles along the four sides of a rectangle.  One has 
acquired for himself the glorious title of “the guillotine.”  He knows every 
thing that was, is, and is not, and never will be.  It certainly looks singular 
to see men making decisions, which resemble a dance of crooked sticks.  
Decisions are sometimes made in the Patent Office, which amount in 
substance to boxing the bones and throwing the compass overboard.95 
An anonymous correspondent writing as “Daclede” extended the attack 
on the “guillotine” examiner, whom he identified as William Fitzgerald: 
The province of an examiner is precisely similar to that of a clerk in a 
mercantile house, to whom the head of the establishment would refer a 
bill for examination when presented at the counter for payment . . . .  Give 
me a vacillating, simple headed enthusiast, in fact, anybody, to reason 
with, in preference to a dogmatic examiner.96 
The charge of decision by “erratics” denied that the office exercised 
expertise.  This rejoinder implicitly asserts that objective decisions would 
be predictable and that the supposed lack of predictability proved the 
absence of expert decision making.  At bottom, however, the responses 
were more concerned with insisting that Scientific American—and, by 
extension, agents—were the true representatives of inventors’ interests and 
that the office was the true enemy. 
Ewbank faced bigger challenges than skirmishing statements in 
magazines.  His 1851 report defended the Patent Office from oversight and 
greater control by the Department of Interior, and he framed his arguments 
by appealing to expertise as against political expedience.97  Again enlisting 
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the interests of inventors, Ewbank insisted that the Patent Office should not 
be subordinate to political appointees such as the head of the Department of 
Interior, men who “have no time to devote to it, and who, from education, 
habits, profession, and feelings, can have little or no active sympathies with 
interests represented in it, or with the class of citizens with whom it has 
most to do . . . .”98  He insisted that “there is an increasing desire among 
inventors and patentees, mechanics, manufacturers and others” that the 
Patent Office should not be subordinate to the Interior Department because, 
“[e]xclusively devoted to the progress of science and art,” the office needed 
to be “wholly freed from political influences . . . .  To suppose the business 
of this office can be carried on, if its desks are occupied, as in some 
departments, by persons even of general qualifications, instead of special 
fitness, is a great mistake.”99 
Ewbank argued that examiners 
ought not to be harassed with calls to answer complaints preferred to the 
Department of Interior, and often to the President, by disappointed 
applicants and their friends; by parties stimulated with promises of large 
sums, made payable on the issue of a patent; and by agents and 
speculators, smarting under the loss of such contingent fees.100 
Again seeking to divide agents from inventors, Ewbank maintained that 
“[t]here is no disposition in the office to refuse patents; the feeling is the 
very reverse. . . .  [I]t is absurd to suppose that refusals are wantonly made, 
there being no possible motive to refuse a patent, but every inducement to 
grant one.  When doubts exist, the benefit is always given to the 
applicant.”101 
An annual report is a feeble weapon against the array of foes Ewbank 
identified, the grievances they asserted, and the ears they bent.  His 
insistence that the office was not too disposed to deny applications reflects 
the narrative his foes had created and the strength it was gaining.  That 
narrative aimed toward increasing the grant rate, and if standards had to be 
loosened and the ideal of expertise had to be swept aside, so be it. 
Ewbank’s ire toward patent agents is particularly instructive.  He 
conceived of “inventors and patentees, mechanics, [and] manufacturers” as 
his constituents, not agents.102  His version of the Information to Persons 
Having Business to Transact pamphlet stated that inventors could deal with 
the Patent Office without agents, that agents received no greater 
consideration than inventors, and, to the contrary, that the office might 
consider “imperfectly prepared” submissions “when such papers are 
prepared by the inventor himself.  But, if an agent be employed, it is 
presumed that he is qualified for the business he has undertaken without 
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calling on the office for instructions.”103  But Ewbank was in a bind:  agents 
helped inventors navigate the bureaucracy created in the 1836 Act, and at 
least some agents worked on contingency.  Combined with disappointed 
applicants, these agents and their networks appear to have been a potent 
political force—potent enough, at any rate, to provoke Ewbank’s appeal for 
independence.104 
Ewbank was gone in 1852,105 to be replaced in 1853 by Judge Charles 
Mason.  Mason worked Congress well, and by 1856, the office had thirty-
six examiners and assistant examiners.106  But in his report that year, Mason 
worried about the scale of the office and the inability of the Commissioner 
to pay close attention to the work—particularly the rejections—of the 
examiner corps.  Mason was a former judge, not a scientist, and he 
lamented that “very few of our lawyers have ever turned their attention in 
this direction.  The law relating to patents is less understood by the 
profession than any other branch of that noble science.”107 
Mason continued to emphasize flesh and blood inventors rather than the 
abstract scientific conception of novelty.  He stressed that patentability 
decisions were not 
matters of trivial moment; at least they are not so to the individual most 
immediately interested.  To him, the offspring of his mental energies are 
something more than property; they are his children, for whom he has 
labored through much of the fairest portion of life’s meridian, and on 
whom he relies for consolation and support in the evening of its 
decline.108 
His concern for inventors manifested itself as a bias in favor of 
traditional adjudication rather than administrative procedure as the final 
forum for patentability decisions. 
Mason’s preference for legal over technical expertise reflected a shift 
away from the premise of expert inquiry.  That is not what goes on in 
courts, as Jefferson pointed out in his letter to McPherson years before.109  
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Yet Mason recommended that Congress consider returning to “former 
practices of the office, making the duties of the examiners simply advisory, 
and allowing a patent in all cases, provided the applicant should finally 
insist upon it, notwithstanding the opinion of the [Patent Office] as to its 
invalidity.”110  As Mason put it, his proposal 
would render the same high order of qualifications and experience less 
absolutely essential in the examining corps.  Most of the legal 
controversies now arising in the [Patent Office] would be turned over to 
the courts of law, which are not only so much better qualified to 
adjudicate, but which possess the necessary machinery to investigate and 
conduct such matters, so as to lead to a result more satisfactory than can 
be done here.111 
The following year, Mason recommended that Congress consider 
(re)adopting a procedure akin to scire facias.112  In 1857, he noted an 
increase over the prior year in patents granted and praised the American 
system as avoiding the evils of registration or overly strict examination.  
His office eschewed “that stern, unsympathizing, distrusting temper, which 
would receive the inventor as a stranger beneath the roof of this magnificent 
edifice, which has been reared at once as a monument to his genius, and as 
a depository of the trophies of his labors.”113  Instead, under Mason, the 
office welcomed “the inventor as a friend and patron, in that frank and free 
conference with him enjoined by law, kindly and anxiously sifts from his 
invention its minutest patentable features . . . .”114 
Patent agents were duly appreciative.  When Mason resigned, Scientific 
American wrote that “[h]e was prompt and fearless in his decisions.  He 
believed that the Patent laws were instituted for the benefit and 
encouragement of inventors, and he interpreted them 
accordingly . . . .  Much of his time was devoted to the repeal of decisions 
by illiberal examiners.”115  For his part, upon leaving the Patent Office 
Mason wrote a nice blurb to Scientific American praising the Munn agency 
as having worked on one quarter of the patents issued during his tenure.116  
Five months later, he was working for Munn.117 
James Holt replaced Mason and took solicitousness for inventors to new 
heights.  The patent laws, he argued, 
should be liberally construed, having ever in view the great end they were 
designed to subserve . . . .  That office, in my judgment, would be 
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forgetful of its mission, and disloyal to one of the highest interests of 
humanity, were it to permit itself to be entangled in a mesh of mere 
words, or palsied by doubts, born of intricate metaphysical disquisitions.  
It has to do with the substance of things, and to deal with the earnest, 
ingenuous, practical intellect of the age, and it should be dealt with 
frankly, not perplexing and discouraging inventors, by subtle distinctions, 
but kindly taking them by the hand, as the benefactors of their race, and 
strewing, if possible, their pathway with sunshine and with flowers.118 
Patent agents liked that idea.  Scientific American noted that Holt’s view 
represented a departure from historical practices—a view it thought more 
“liberal” than before.119  It drew a line between new examiners, who got 
Holt’s message and followed it, and the old “croakers,” who remained 
stubbornly mired in old ways.120  To the extent one may infer the views of 
patent agents from the opinions of Scientific American at the time, Holt’s 
administration emboldened them.  The prospect that they could take 
prosecution matters on contingency with a high probability of getting a 
patent of some scope issued must have been intoxicating. 
The implications of the situation were made clear two years later, in 
Commissioner Bishop’s annual report.  In 1859, he asked Congress to 
amend the law so that interferences were resolved in favor of the first to file 
either a caveat (a form of provisional application) or an application.121  He 
conjectured that his proposal would “be sanctioned by most men of 
standing and respectability,” but that “a certain class of patent agents, who 
seek to make profit by aiding dishonest men in annoying and robbing 
honest inventors of their just rights rather than by an honorable practice of 
their profession, may endeavor to defeat any amendment of the law which 
will diminish litigation, fraud, perjury, and corruption.”122  He regretted 
“that the present law affords so many facilities for the dishonest practices of 
such men, by whom innocent inventors are continually plundered.”123 
Bishop revived the traditional practice of asking for more examiners, 
asserting, “Rather than suffer the business of the office to become seriously 
delayed we have been compelled to grant patents upon hasty examinations.  
As a natural consequence, many things have been patented which ought to 
have been rejected.”124  But the tide had turned.  “Of the twelve principal 
examiners in the office when Holt took over, five had been removed by 
early 1858 and all but two of the rest before the war.”125  Conventional 
politics played a role—the Civil War loomed on the horizon, after all, and 
some examiners were “Black Republicans”—but Post argues convincingly 
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that “liberalization” of standards and the consequent reduction in emphasis 
on “scientific” examination was important, too.126 
In 1860, Scientific American praised the “very marked change” in the 
office over the preceding three years and noted that “its officers, with few 
exceptions, exhibit in their official views and actions a uniform and 
commendable liberality of disposition toward inventors.”127  When, a few 
months later, Commissioner Thomas proposed a “Revising Board” of two 
examiners, to whom other examiners would have to justify decisions to 
issue patents, a correspondent to Scientific American objected that the 
examiners appointed “have been educated in the illiberal old school practice 
of the [Patent] Office, which prevailed as far back as 1850, 1851, and 1852, 
when terror to the inventor reigned triumphant.”128  The editors added a 
footnote explaining that 
[i]t was in these years that two thirds of the applications for patents were 
rejected.  In 1853 Judge Mason was appointed to the Commissionership, 
and he soon brought about a new order of things, by impressing upon the 
Examiners the fact that it was their duty to see on what points in an 
invention placed before them a patent could be allowed, instead of 
studying to discover on what grounds they could reject an application.129 
Scientific American complained that, in the first week of results after the 
new board began its work, only thirty patents issued, compared to a 
previous weekly rate of one hundred.130  Thomas lasted only ten months 
before moving to President Buchanan’s cabinet as Secretary of the 
Treasury.131  The revisory board turned out to be toothless and in any event 
lasted barely longer than Thomas.132 
Scientific American, and doubtless inventors and agents as well, wanted 
to have its cake and eat it too.  It wanted highly qualified examiners whose 
reputations would command deference from courts, but who would help 
applicants get patents, not point out the lack of novelty of their inventions.  
Political hacks could satisfy the second condition, but endangered the first.  
In 1861, it protested that “we have earnestly contended against debasing the 
Patent Office into a political cesspool, to be groveled in by a mess of 
loafers, such as hang about Custom Houses and other hot beds of political 
corruption.”133  It complained that 
[t]he Patent Office has gradually become demoralized, and is losing that 
dignified position which it enjoyed even but a short time ago, some of its 
attaches being unfitted, either mentally or morally, to fill the places they 
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now occupy; and inventors have become, in some degree, disgusted with 
the whole concern.134 
The Patent Act was amended in 1861, in part to secure “greater 
uniformity of action in the grant and refusal of letters” by appointing 
three examiners-in-chief . . . to be composed of persons of competent 
legal knowledge and scientific ability, whose duty it shall be, on the 
written petition of the applicant for that purpose being filed, to revise and 
determine upon the validity of decisions made by examiners when 
adverse to the grant of letters-patent.135 
Congressional debate over the provision raised the question whether such 
appointees could in fact be expected to be disinterested experts.  New 
Hampshire Senator John Hale scoffed at the idea that 
these examiners will be scientific men, legal men, men that are well 
qualified.  Does not the Senator know, and does not everybody who 
knows anything about the Patent Office know, that it is just as much a 
piece of party machinery as the Supreme Court is, or any other 
department of the Government?136 
Hale’s criticism implied that examination of prospective patent 
examiners did not interfere with political considerations.137  A 
correspondent writing as “Aquinas” expressed similar views in Scientific 
American, complaining that the Patent Office, 
[i]n spite of the good intentions of the Commissioner[,] . . . is becoming 
more and more, under its present regime, an asylum for deaf and dumb 
fossils and political hacks. . . .  [C]annot the inventor’s interest be better 
served than by stuffing mere politicians into technical places for which 
they have no fitness?138 
In 1866, Scientific American complained that “Jefferson’s rule, ‘Is he 
honest?  [I]s he faithful?’[,] has given way to the more dangerous rule, ‘Is 
he a good party man, has he political influence?’”139 
The second half of the nineteenth century tended to confirm these 
assessments.  Between 1869 and 1901, five former members of Congress 
became patent commissioners.140  Three of these were lame ducks who had 
lost an election; the commissioner’s post was a sinecure granted by soon-to-
be-former colleagues.141  Between 1861 and 1877, the three-member board 
of appeals had fifteen members.142  In 1877, Commissioner Spear 
complained that “[u]nder such conditions it must appear inevitable that 
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there could not have been uniformity or the constant exercise of the wisest 
discretion in the granting of patents.  The whole tendency has been toward 
an excessive issue of patents, and there is need of constant supervision.”143 
E.  The Pendulum Swings Back 
By 1868, the tide began to shift again, and the notion of expertise and the 
attendant prospect of rigorous examination were again at the center of the 
debates.  In his 1867 report, Commissioner Theaker wrote that “to some the 
thorough acquaintance of an examiner with his class is simply regarded as a 
possible obstacle in the way of obtaining a patent.”144  Commissioner Foote 
announced merits-based cleaning of the stables in 1869.145  He wrote that 
he was “unable to attribute the extraordinary increase of the last few years 
in the number of patents issued to an equal increase of real improvements; 
for I apprehend that much of apparent prosperity has arisen from the 
allowance of patents that should never have been granted.”146  He 
complained that examiners’ decisions were subject to rigorous review when 
they denied an application, but 
[a]n examiner’s action receives no such scrutiny when he allows a patent.  
If he be pressed for time, or be indifferent as to his duties, he may put an 
end to his labors by a simple indorsement [sic].  If he lacks capacity, there 
will then be no exposure of his ignorance or of the unsoundness of his 
views.  It may have happened that in some instances the allowance of 
patents has served to cloak incapacity and indifference to duty.147 
Foote therefore made it a priority to “improve the qualifications of 
examiners and obtain a high order of ability in the examining corps.”148  He 
appointed a three-man committee to examine the qualifications of the 
examiners.149  He reported that “[t]he duty has been, so far, faithfully and 
judiciously performed, and several changes in the [Patent Office] have 
resulted therefrom.”150  Things evidently had deteriorated to the point that 
Scientific American applauded this move.  “Among other reforms 
introduced,” it wrote, “is that of examination of examiners, to see if they are 
qualified for their duties.”151  In the future, 
before any appointment can be made the candidate will be thoroughly 
examined as to his fitness for the place.  He must possess at least some 
show of qualification or he cannot be appointed.  All those now in the 
Office will have to submit to this examination, and if found unqualified 
will be discharged. . . .  The Commissioner intends to raise the standard of 
principal examiners to that of the judges of our common courts, and 
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means to do away with the practice heretofore in vogue of appointing 
persons to positions simply because they happen to be related to some 
M.C. or Senator.152 
Judges of course were not selected for scientific expertise, and political 
influence is not wholly unknown in judicial selection, so this aspiration is 
telling in and of itself. 
The Patent Office introduced competitive examinations for patent 
examiners in 1869, thirteen years before the Pendleton Act began inching 
the civil service as a whole toward merit-based selection.153  Commissioner 
Fisher explained that 
it may be conceded that, by this method, in exceptional cases, a competent 
man may be kept out of office, but an incompetent one can very rarely 
come in.  To lessen the chances of error, great care has been taken in 
adapting the examination to the work to be done, so that theory and 
practice must both be combined to achieve the highest measure of 
success[,] . . . the result upon the Office at large, and especially as shown 
in the character and capacity of new employees, has been most 
gratifying.154 
In a famous article in the North American Review, Jacob D. Cox, an 
ardent civil service reformer, then recently departed as Secretary of the 
Interior, praised the Patent Office as “demonstrative proof” of the benefits 
of competitive examination designed to weed out incompetent aspirants for 
agency jobs.155 
Lawyers continued to play their part in the problems of the Patent Office.  
A pension act providing for disability payments was adopted in 1862156 
and, owing to the carnage of the Civil War, pensions became big legal 
business in the post-war period.157  Pension applications were made ex 
parte, without examination of the applicant, so the system resembled the 
patent-by-oath practice of the 1793 Act.158  It was an invitation to fraud, 
which was acknowledged as inevitable.159  Lawyers trolled for clients who 
might claim pensions, and the full range of supposedly modern abuses were 
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on display.160  In 1898, 60,000 lawyers were authorized to practice before 
the pension board.161  One of them, George Lemon, had 125,000 matters 
(including pending and rejected claims) in his office.162  An 1878 statute 
used price regulation to address the problem, limiting fees in pension cases 
to ten dollars.163 
At this point, both the Pension Board and the Patent Office operated from 
within the Department of Interior and, from a certain very crude angle, both 
pension applications and patent applications involved getting things from 
the government.  So, to some pension agents, it seemed natural to expand 
their practice to include patent applications as well.  In his 1869 annual 
report, Commissioner Fisher summarized the problems patent agents posed 
for the Patent Office—pursuing contingent fees they sought patents on 
“mere technical combinations” and cared more “about the number than the 
quality of those which they obtain.”164  The worst of them “adopt this 
business as an incident to a claim agency, and press for patents as they press 
for back pay and pensions.”165  They took advantage of inventors who were 
often “poor, uneducated, and lacking any legal knowledge” and who wanted 
“a cheap solicitor, and do not know how to choose a good one.”166  
Solicitors who “care for nothing but to give [clients] something called a 
patent, that they may secure their own fee, have in too many instances 
proved a curse.”167 
As noted above, dissatisfaction with the practices of patent agents 
predated the 1862 Pension Act.  The 1861 amendment to the Patent Act 
gave the Commissioner power, “for gross misconduct,” to “refuse to 
recognize any person as a patent agent, either generally or in any particular 
case; but the reasons of the Commissioner for such refusal shall be duly 
recorded, and subject to the approval of the President of the United 
States.”168  This provision echoed Burke’s call, as a private citizen, eleven 
years earlier.  The provision was carried forward in the 1870 Act, though it 
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only required the consent of the Secretary of the Interior rather than the 
President.169  In 1870, Scientific American reported that Foote had 
suspended McGill, Grant & Co., and George W. McGill from practice, the 
first suspensions the editors knew of, though the power had existed for nine 
years.170 
The Patent Office’s power was expanded in 1884, when Congress gave 
the Secretary of the Interior power to 
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, 
attorneys, or other persons representing claimants before his 
department . . . [and] after notice and opportunity for hearing, suspend or 
exclude from further practice before his department any such person, 
agent or attorney shown to be incompetent, disreputable, or who refuses 
to comply with the said rules and regulations . . . .171 
The statute was aimed at pension agents but, as the Patent Office was in 
the Department of Interior as well, by its terms it also extended to patent 
agents.  Consistent with the statutory text, Wedderburn v. Bliss172 held that 
such discipline was administrative and not subject to judicial review.  The 
Patent Office began registering attorneys in 1899 and, in 1922, it received 
the power to enact its own regulations of patent agents and attorneys.173 
F.  The Rise and Decline of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine 
The 1790 and 1793 Acts had a crude mechanism that theoretically might 
have helped compensate for the limited expertise possessed by the Board of 
Arts and the absence of expertise in the registration system.  Each act 
carried forward a form of the English writ of scire facias by creating a right 
of action to cancel a patent.174  Within a year of issuance, under the 1790 
Act, or three years under the 1793 Act, a challenger could submit an oath 
showing that the patent had been obtained “surreptitiously, or upon false 
suggestion.”175  Courts receiving such oaths could issue orders to show 
cause why the patent should not be repealed.176  This right of action 
provided means by which persons with expertise showing a patent invalid 
could bring that expertise to bear within the patent system broadly 
construed, though not the grant process itself.  The right of action was not 
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carried forward in the 1836 Act.177  “Only in the case of interference did the 
1836 Act provide a private right that might lead to cancellation,”178 though, 
as we have seen, Commissioner Mason’s legalism led him to recommend 
the revival of scire facias practice.179 
Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear180 and Mowry v. Whitney181 noted 
the 1836 Act’s elimination of the private right of action for cancellation; 
Mowry conceived of the writ as asserting a right belonging to the defrauded 
party—the government.182  United States v. American Bell Telephone 
Co.183 held that the government could sue to repeal a fraudulently procured 
patent, though the 1836 Act contained no such provision.184  The modern 
doctrine began to take shape with Keystone Driller Co. v. General 
Excavator Co.,185 which held that fraud on the PTO compelled vacatur of a 
fraudulently obtained judgment. 
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.186 extended Keystone.  
The patentee in Hazel-Atlas drafted an article to be used in support of a 
patent application and paid a well-known union official to sign it.187  The 
patentee submitted the article to the PTO, passing it off as the official’s own 
work.188  The patent issued, and Hartford sued Hazel-Atlas for 
infringement.189  Hartford lost at the trial court and, on appeal, relied 
heavily on the article.190  The appellate court entered a judgment of validity 
and infringement; its opinion quoted Hartford’s article.191  Hazel-Atlas then 
tracked down the union president to question him about the article.192  He 
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would not talk to Hazel-Atlas, but he did give Hartford an affidavit and 
received eight thousand dollars shortly thereafter.193  Holding that “[t]here 
are issues of great moment to the public in a patent suit,” the Court vacated 
the judgment.194  The following year, the Court wrote that “[a] patent by its 
very nature is affected with a public interest,”195 the language that begins 
Rule 56 to this day. 
Dissenting in Hazel-Atlas, Justice Roberts noted that “[i]t is complained 
that members of the bar have knowingly participated in the fraud.  
Remedies are available to purge recreant officers from the tribunals on 
whom the fraud was practiced.”196  The PTO took notice.  It instituted 
disciplinary proceedings against three lawyers involved in the proceedings 
and disbarred them.197  Prosecution counsel, Dorsey, appealed.198  The D.C. 
Circuit reversed, in part chiding the PTO for lacking ordinary common 
sense, much less expertise: 
It was the duty of the Patent Office under the law to investigate these 
matters for itself, to arrive at a determination on the facts and evidence 
presented and not to shift the burden of its own responsibilities to a blind 
reliance on some article presented from some trade journal, which with 
ordinary intelligence it might have known to be self-serving for the party 
offering it.199 
The Supreme Court was not persuaded.  It reversed, in a brief per curiam 
opinion.200 
Rule 1.56 was adopted in 1977.201  The PTO said it codified “the existing 
[Patent] Office policy on fraud and inequitable conduct, which is believed 
consistent with the prevailing case law in the federal courts.”202  Some 
commentators disagreed that the rule reflected previous office practice,203 
but with the backing of the Supreme Court, the existence—if not the 
contours—of such a duty was secure.  Like the rigor of examination and the 
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ideal of disinterested expertise, the inequitable conduct doctrine waxed and 
waned over the years.  Some cases relied on Rule 1.56 in assessing 
materiality of alleged misstatement or omissions.204  PTO practitioners 
decried a “plague” of allegations, however, and called for the doctrine to be 
narrowed.205  As before, they proved to be an influential group.  In 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,206 the Federal Circuit held 
that inequitable conduct requires proof of intent to defraud the PTO and 
but-for materiality, meaning that a patent would not have issued but for 
deceit by a patentee or its agent.207 
II.  LAWYERING WITHIN THE DOMAIN OF EXPERTISE 
The history surveyed in Part I illustrates important aspects of the 
relationship between administration as a means of regulation and the 
practice of law.  At all points in time, patentees had to sue infringers in 
court, so ordinary litigation practices were never absent from the picture.  
Under the 1793 Act, however, they were essentially all that stood between a 
purported inventor and his hoped-for riches.  The picture became more 
complicated when the 1836 Act introduced the prospect of expert review.  
In theory, patents that issued after expert scrutiny deserved a greater 
presumption of validity than patents that issued upon oath under the 
registration system.  Expert examination up front would tend to favor 
patentees in litigation, but if lawyers worked both sides of the street, there 
would be no net effect on their business over the general run of cases, 
except to the extent that fewer patents implied fewer cases.208 
The picture looked different from an ex ante perspective.  Greater 
confidence in issued patents would be no solace to a client whose 
application was rejected.  Neither would it do much for counsel prosecuting 
the application on a contingent fee basis.  Lawyers and agents who limited 
their practice to prosecution, therefore, might well favor the appearance of 
expert review without the substance.  Litigators working both sides of the 
street might favor that approach as well, at least to the extent that more 
patents might imply more work.  Lawyers who represent only infringers 
might hope for more stringent, gold-plated review to avoid a lemons-style 
problem, but even they would realize that a patent that does not issue 
cannot be asserted. 
Patent lawyers thus straddle the fence of expert review.  They want 
patents to carry the prestige of having passed examination while retaining 
as much of their own strategy space as possible.  The antagonism to strict 
“illiberal” review seen in the 1840s and 1850s reflects a basic antagonism 
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between lawyers who seek maneuvering room to ply their trade and 
examiners who wanted to apply expertise.209  To an expert examiner, an 
invention either was or was not novel in relation to the prior art, for 
example, and while the nature of the question of novelty might be specified 
by statute, the answer and the means of obtaining it posed technical 
questions.  From this perspective, the lawyer’s tradecraft—drawing 
distinctions, framing facts, inflating or deflating the significance of 
evidence, making tactical concessions, and so on—amounted to noise. 
This ambivalence can be seen in the unsuccessful efforts of lawyers to 
use state licensing regulations to exclude nonlawyers from practice before 
the PTO.  In the early 1960s, Florida sued Alexander Sperry, a nonlawyer 
admitted to practice before the PTO, to enjoin him from pursuing his 
practice while a resident in Florida.210  Though conceding that patent 
prosecution is “the practice of law,” the Court held that federal regulation of 
practice before the PTO precluded Florida from asserting its laws against 
unlicensed practice to enjoin Sperry’s PTO work.211  A group of patent 
agents submitted a brief as amici curiae asking how mastery of bar subjects 
suited one to prosecute patents and whether Florida bar examiners felt 
qualified to assess a patent agent’s application—good points, each.212 
In Sperry v. Florida Bar,213 the bar’s protectionist impulses ran headlong 
into both science and history, and lawyerly self-interest proved too weak to 
overcome their combined force.  The bar’s effort is instructive, however, as 
providing a concrete example of a contested conceptual space between 
lawyers’ work and “science,” or, more generally, between advocacy and 
expertise.  I contend that we may extrapolate from the example of patent 
prosecution, and from its history, to draw more general insights regarding 
the relationship between lawyers and the administrative state.  Though there 
are many justifications for regulation, an agency’s claim of disinterested 
expertise will tend to produce stricter rules on lawyers’ behavior than would 
be found absent that claim. 
A.  Distinguishing Regulatory Justifications 
Roughly speaking, we can identify three genres of regulation; it is best to 
think of these genres of regulation as shading into one another on a 
continuum, rather than as distinct categories.  In the first, a regulation is 
justified by specialized knowledge an agency claims to have.  An invention 
either is or is not useful, novel, and nonobvious; a cancer drug either is or is 
not safe and effective, relative to a placebo. 
The second genre adds administrative enforcement to things that are 
unlawful already; the SEC or FTC may punish false statements about a 
company or its products, for example.  Such belt-and-suspenders regulation 
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may target legitimate areas of underenforcement, but underenforcement 
itself implies only a need for more or better enforcers.  Underenforcement 
does not entail the need for a new agency.  A claim to specialized 
knowledge thus helps justify agency regulation as the form the extra layer 
of enforcement takes. 
A third category combines the first two.  Expertise may be employed to 
create new categories of wrongs not otherwise explicitly prohibited.  Thus, 
the SEC may mandate particular forms of accounting and treat deviations as 
unlawful, the FDA may prohibit the sale of drugs that have not been shown 
to be safe and effective using specified methods, or the EPA may set limits 
on discharges.214 
Before exploring the implications of the first category, I want to 
acknowledge some limitations on these distinctions.  These categories 
exclude some important features of regulation.  As a practical matter, 
regulation is often just cartelization with a government stamp.  Much 
licensing—including licensing of lawyers—is like this.  We should not lose 
sight of this fact, but for the moment we can focus on the claim of expertise 
as a justification for regulation, even if in fact the justification is just 
window dressing.  The claim to possess expertise is a sideshow when 
protectionism is at work, but the claim still may be significant with respect 
to how the agency approaches lawyers who practice before it.  These 
distinctions also do not talk about vertical integration of enforcement, or 
about how modes of regulation rulemaking is different from adjudication, 
which in turn is different from oversight by the late, unlamented Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS).  And some tasks that are uniquely federal—
immigration being an obvious example, as well as import-related regulation 
such as is practiced in the International Trade Commission—will tend 
toward the agency form because there is no ready alternative. 
Finally, disinterested expertise is good, but it is not—and cannot be—
everything.215  Even assuming we can discern that mandatory vaccination 
will have debilitating side effects in ten cases while saving one hundred 
lives, we must decide whether the trade-off is worth it.  We can construct 
equations expressing these trade-offs, but the values of the variables have to 
come from somewhere, and there is no reason to expect that disinterested 
expertise can answer what is essentially a question of values.  Various 
flavors of Hume may be recited—even assuming we can get a handle on the 
“is” of the question, doing so does not get us to “ought.”216 
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The appeal of expertise cannot be realized in full.  Even where it might 
succeed as a scientific matter, practical application drags expertise into the 
muddled mire of politics and ethics.  From this angle, there is no such thing 
as “disinterested” expertise because expert procedures contest with 
alternatives such as faith, ideology, and custom.  Lawyering in the 
regulatory state therefore may be viewed as part of a problem memorably 
described by Arthur Leff as the conflict between the desire for “findable 
rules that authoritatively and unambiguously direct us how to live” and 
desire to be free to choose what to do and how to live.217 
Nevertheless, none of these limitations implies that distinguishing among 
regulatory justifications is pointless or that we can learn nothing by 
exploring the first category, in which administration is justified at least in 
part by the claim to possess expertise.  Thus caveated, I contend that, in 
general, agencies claiming to wield expertise will want to reign in lawyers 
in rough proportion to the plausibility of that claim.  The stronger the claim, 
the more an agency will try to reign in lawyers, and vice versa.  The reason 
is simple:  within the domain of expertise, lawyers have relatively little to 
do.  Their stock in trade—framing and other rhetorical tricks, bluffing, 
crafty negotiation, cloaking evidence with the veils of privilege or work 
product—is of little value when the question is whether lead in gasoline is 
bad for people, whether Thalidomyde crosses the placental barrier and 
disrupts the formation of a fetus, or whether Cetuximab is effective in 
patients with KRAS mutant cancers. 
Within the domain of disinterested expertise, lawyers, as lawyers, are 
more likely to contribute noise than signal.  They can serve as efficient 
information gatherers, and in some cases can enhance clarity through the 
arrangement of information in relation to specified purposes, but 
arrangement is a relatively thin increment of information, and lawyers are 
duty-bound to favor arrangements that favor their clients, which may or 
may not imply arrangements that increase the efficiency of administration. 
B.  Tension Between Truth and Competing Values 
This point may be sharpened further, though at the risk of caricature.  
Suppose there are two types of issues of possible interest to lawyers:  truth 
and fairness.  In the domain of truth, we presume a high degree of 
consensus on standards for assessing some subject; we denote that 
consensus by proclaiming that the standards are “objective.”  In the domain 
of fairness, subjectivity counts.  Even if there are some objective standards 
for some assessment, within the domain of fairness they do not exhaust all 
points relevant to a question.  This division roughly corresponds to the way 
defamation law determines whether a statement is one of fact or one of 
opinion, though this division raises some distinct problems of its own.218 
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This dichotomy has some tricky aspects.  Many true propositions would 
gain lots of votes as being fair, but those votes are not essential to truth.  
Propositions that imply or entail horribly unfair things may nonetheless be 
true.  Some might take issue with the second presumption necessary for this 
dichotomy to work:  that there is no truth of the matter about fairness.  I 
think that is right.  There are (lawyerly) ways to tease truth out of fairness, 
though they tend to involve sociobiological explanations that are 
controversial and which try to lessen the subjectivity of fairness by 
grounding it in science. 
This dichotomy does not entail that any given problem implicates only 
one domain.  There may be a truth of the matter about whether the 
defendant killed the victim, as there is about whether a molecule starves 
cancerous cells, but it does not follow that truth is all that is at stake if we 
put the defendant on trial.  If it did, all reliable methods of investigation 
would be acceptable, yet the law layers fairness concerns (thinly) on top of 
this goal.  The right to counsel and prohibitions on beating confessions out 
of suspects come to mind. 
The domains of fairness and truth coexist, but often they are in tension 
and the relative influence of the domains changes over time.  Within the 
domain of expertise, as the administrative state grows it stakes greater 
claims to truth as a value and tries to expand the domain in which lawyers 
and clients must conform their behavior to the primacy of that value.  Often 
that means strict disclosure obligations imposed by financial regulators and 
the PTO that would (for now) seem bizarre and unconstitutional in a 
criminal trial.  The lure of expertise exerts a more subtle influence, as 
lawyers leverage scientific evidence or explain, apologetically, that 
convictions may be had even without the sort of forensic evidence jurors 
might see on television. 
III.  WHAT WILL REMAIN? 
Most readers of this Article have been wily enough to see what is 
coming, so let me repeat:  claims to expertise may fail, expertise possessed 
may not be applied, and where regulation is justified on grounds other than 
expertise, my argument in this Article does not apply.  Nevertheless, within 
the asserted domain of expertise, the argument in Part II gives lawyers 
peripheral roles.  Lawyerly training may lead one to take center stage and 
proclaim, “I come not to answer the question, but to problematize it!”219  
But in the domain of expertise, that speech never takes center stage.  It is 
whispered from the wings if heard at all. 
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Some lawyers, particularly academic lawyers, dislike the suggestion that 
they might play Osric someday but never Hamlet.  They insist that 
problematizing is valuable, that they still have something to bring to the 
table (and by implication that they still deserve a seat there), even if all they 
have to offer is various arguments of the form “is that fair/says who?”  True 
enough.  My point is comparative:  within the domain of fairness, this sort 
of argument may say most of what can be said, and lawyer-sophists—
philosophical or otherwise—may sit at the head of the table.  Within the 
domain of expertise, they sit farther down the table if they get a seat at all.  
When a strong claim of expertise is made, they may find themselves 
relegated to the children’s table and be told to be seen but not heard. 
Assuming expert means for finding it (a big assumption, to be sure), the 
aspiration to truth constrains rhetoric.  When truth is the prime value and 
expertise is adopted as the means of finding it then, as a practical matter, 
lawyers either must conform to the narrow constraints of disinterested 
expertise or insist that some other game must be played.  That is roughly 
what happened in the 1840s and 1850s, when patent agents and inventors 
complained that examinations were too strict.  Unhappy with having to 
prove novelty, which at least in theory is an inquiry that takes the falsifiable 
form of the assertion that a claimed invention has not been used or 
disclosed before, advocates shifted the focus to inventors and their 
aspirations.  Rhetorically they succeeded in shifting from logos to pathos as 
the primary mode of discourse.  Logically the move had essentially nothing 
to commend it, but the move gave lawyers and their clients more strategy 
space.  The resulting mess eventually provoked Commissioner Fisher’s 
reaction—competitive examinations and a renewed emphasis on precision 
and rigor—and a corresponding reduction in strategy space.  As one might 
have guessed by now, this cycle recurs predictably in the history of patent 
law.  It seems intrinsic to the process.  To this day, patent prosecutors with 
law degrees earn more than patent agents, and the differential wage reflects 
incremental learning in legal rhetoric, not science.  Indeed, the size of the 
wage disparity is evidence of the degree to which the patent system cannot 
be relied upon to allow applications based on scientific rather than legal 
grounds. 
To the extent this generalization is accurate, it implies three things.  First, 
within the domain of expertise, confidentiality will be a less important 
value than accuracy, and lawyers’ assertions of confidentiality will be more 
contested than they are in other domains.  Rule 1.56 exemplifies this point, 
as does the OTS’s displeasure with Kaye Scholer’s alleged attempt to 
interpose itself between the OTS as regulator and Lincoln Savings as a 
regulated entity.220  It is more common for disclosure obligations to target 
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clients rather than lawyers, but the relative point still holds.  Where 
disinterested expertise justifies regulation, the experts need something to 
work with, which implies strong disclosure rules.  It also implies that courts 
should be more willing to entertain claims of selective waiver, which would 
allow regulated companies to provide information to supposedly expert 
regulators without feeding the frenzy of decidedly nonexpert civil 
litigation.221  Lawyers who cannot shift the rhetorical ground and change 
the game they have to play will be stuck with a relatively subservient role, 
at least compared to lawyers who deal with private disputes or regulation 
that is not justified by claims of expertise. 
The second point might be called “Sperry’s revenge.”  As we shift from 
the domain of fairness to the domain of truth, we invite entry by any and all 
truth producers, including programmers, economists, statisticians, and other 
nonlawyers.  The engineer’s claim to be better able to prosecute patents has 
turned from a defensive protection of legacy rights to a tactical incursion 
into work that used to be performed by lawyers.  Even within nonexpert 
domains, such as general litigation, much of the work may be expertised 
and therefore made competitive.  There is no reason to expect that trend to 
change. 
Finally, the prospect of disinterested expertise raises the question why 
rules governing advocacy before tribunals would ever be concerned with 
giving lawyers enough room to strut their stuff.  Possibly there is no truth of 
the matter, though then one wonders why a tribunal should be convened.  
What is it supposed to do?  Bizarre epistemologies may be espoused, and 
the “standard model” of lawyering may accommodate them, but often they 
are implausible on their face and they prove too much:  if knowledge is so 
elusive the cumbersome apparatus of a trial is pointless.  Possibly there is a 
truth, but no consensus exists on the means of ascertaining it.  That happens 
often enough, but it does not justify efforts to skew results within any 
particular means, such as by sowing distrust of a truthful witness, or 
engaging in rhetoric detached from any plausible relationship to the truth. 
Any difference in practice may be assessed from either of the contrasting 
perspectives.  For most lawyers, it would be natural to ask why the PTO 
imposes affirmative disclosure obligations—but it is equally fair to ask why 
other tribunals do not.  The administrative state has expanded over time, 
bringing more and more subjects within the domain of claimed expertise; 
there is no reason to expect that process to stop.  This expansion invites 
arguments about what lawyers do and should be allowed to do and about 
how important truth is in comparison to other values.  The process 
complements other, more market-oriented changes that tend to put pressure 
on traditional conceptions of what lawyers may and should do.  As clients 
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push from the market side, experts touting the primacy of truth over fairness 
will do so from the government side.  These complementary forces will 
continue to exert pressure on lawyers to justify their methods in terms of 
results rather than tradition. 
